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This book attacks the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) for its stance vis-à-vis the Third
World. The burden of the attack is borne, not so
much by the particular brand of financial ortho-
doxy often attributed to the IMF, as by the role
of acolyte to US designs which the author per-
ceives in IMF behaviour.
Except for the lucky few, her argument goes, the
countries on the periphery find that independent
economic growth along the lines of their own
best interests is hard to achieve, because of an
ever-threatening foreign-exchange constraint.
Before a crisis, the peripheral country has gen-
erally been jogging along for better or for worse,
with pretensions to economic and political
independence, and with the sort of internal
contradictions which are the lot of backward,
semi- industrial economies (a hungry population,
idle capitalists hungry for profits, and govern-
ments too weak to reconcile the two unless the
going is unusually favourable). When for one
reason or another the inevitable foreign-exchange
crisis comes, the IMFPayer chargessides with
the interests of the foreign (chiefly US) monopo-
lists rather than support those who would deal
with the crisis by planning, controls, and other
means that, judiciously applied, need not mortgage
national independence. In the author's view the
tenets of IMF orthodoxy (budget restraint, free-
dom to import, attractive terms for foreign capital
including wage restraint and 'realistically' priced
foreign exchange, etc.) are only a convenient
screen for the subversion to be undertaken and,
il inconvenient, the orthodoxy is forgotten. The
IMF's real trick, according to Payer, is to get
the country hooked on foreign debt. At first the
IMF rallies the 'aid' agencies and the US banks
around its programme for the prodigal son, and
much money is forthcoming to resolve the imme-
diate crisis (even so, there may yet be an inter-
vening depression); as time goes by, however, the
jeripheral country is locked into the relentless vice
of increasingly burdensome terms which only
further concessions to foreign capital will mitigate.
Soon enough the benefits of dependence, political
and economic, are accruing only to a small para-
sitic class.
The thesis is supported by accounts of various
episodes in the Third World where the author
claims to have detected signs of IMF involvement
along the above lines (Brazil in 1964, India
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around the devaluation of the rupee, Indonesia
under Suharto, Indochina during the Vietnam
war, and the Philippines and Yugoslavia since
World War 11), together with praise for sorne
instances of self-reliance (Allende's Chile, Ghana
in the 1970s, and North Korea).
Why is this a bad book, as I think it is? Certainly
there is no point in pretending that the post-war
system, in any of its forms, was designed or has
evolved with the particular interests of the peri-
pheral countries in mind. When Keynes at Savan-
nah warned of the curse of politics he was
thinking of the Allies, and for the rest he only
ever mentioned "international loans and credits
for legitimate purposes." The IMF charter, now
more honoured in the breach than in the obser-
vance, abounds in that peculiarly Anglo-Saxon
legal fiction, whereby all countries are treated as
equals. But this should deceive no-one: hier-
archies and spheres of influence, for better or
for worse, have always been the order of the day
in international monetary matters. The IMF itself
is more of a compere to leading currencies
(especially the US dollar, naturally enough) than
a substitute for their act. The periphery can only
hope to thrive within the system incidentally, as
clients, particularly when (as over the period
1967-73) there is competition among leading
currencies. Even so it is a serious question whether
some of the technicalities of the arrangements (as
distinct from the underlying imperialisms) do not
mar those moments of grace. In any event it
cannot be argued even by its defenders that the
system has been purposively at pains to incorpor-
ate half the world's population of Iatídless
peasants and urban poor into the general
prosperity. The advocates of self-reliance ought
always to be heard, even when the blandishments
of the international system are most compelling.
But what Payer fails to appreciate (for all her
talk about sacrifice) is that self-relance is not
something which can be created according to a
formula. It requires a stable national identity or,
in orther words, a political settlement. Slaughter
and expulsion that can accompany a rapid move-
ment towards self-reliance are no political settle-
ment, though they may be a prologue to it. Oddly
enough, where the conditions for self-reliance
exist, a lasting place in the international financial
sun is also possible. If we take a long enough
time-span we find peripheral countries repeatedly
tightening and loosening their links to the
international system, in cyclical fashion, according
to their (sadly lagging) perception of the balance
of advantages. Some, like Japan, have at length
broken into the charmed circle. But for the sort
of intermediate régimes visited by the IMF and
discussed by Payer this is not yet possible, essen-
tially for internal reasons: a thin layer of local
capitalists and increasingly well-to-do lower
middle classes manning the state apparatus have
to live by their wits, temporizing with the landless
peasants and urban poor when conditions do not
allow their exploitation. The national identity
shifts its base towards the poor when foreign
markots for goods and funds disappoint, and
towards the international system when the threat-
ening genie of rising wages for the poor needs
to be compressed back into its bottle. There is
no abiding 'debt trap', only a long succession of
debt repudiations and asset seizures alternating
with generous accommodation of foreign capital.
The dynamics and the issue of the process are a
painful puzzle to all but the doctrinaire.
Payer's book is poor on its own terms too, though
to my mind that is by far the lesser failing,
Basically an emotional and often eloquent indict-
ment of US operations, it quite fails to clinch the
1MF connection (even when World Bank opera-
tions are thrown in for good measure). Almost sur-
prisingly, considering the 130 pages over which it
is scattered, the evidence against the IMF staff is
extremely thin and circumstantial. (Indeed, the
book is really about the United States, the World
Bank, and the IMF, in that order.) The economics
are coarse and I should not wonder if, given time
and disappointments, the author, like others
before her, were unwittingly to come round to
precisely the sort of orthodox rules of thumb
which she has incidentally berated here. With
better economics, the same sort of published
sources, and the same unseholarly vein, I
can conceive of much thicker dossiers being
compiled against scores of worthy ministries and
international bodies, to say nothing further of the
IMF. As I have tried to argue above, such
compilations do not lay bare the real difficulties
of a backward country in international exchange.
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